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Reassessing biopsychosocial psychiatry 
Will Davies & Rebecca Roache 
 
ABSTRACT: Psychiatry uncomfortably spans biological and psychosocial perspectives on 
mental illness, an idea central to Engel’s biopsychosocial paradigm (BPS). The BPS paradigm 
was extremely ambitious, proposing new foundations for clinical practice as well as a non-
reductive metaphysics for mental illness. Perhaps given this scope, the approach has failed 
to engender a clearly identifiable research programme. And yet the view remains influential. 
We reassess the relevance of the BPS paradigm for psychiatry, distinguishing a number of 
ways in which it could be (re)conceived. 
 
Psychiatry uncomfortably spans biological and psychosocial perspectives on mental illness. As a 
branch of medicine, psychiatry is under pressure to conform to a biomedical model, on which 
genuine mental disorders are classified as diseases, to be characterised primarily in biological terms. 
Contemporary psychiatry also draws heavily on psychotherapeutic approaches, which focus on the 
psychosocial factors involved in mental disorder. Here concepts of abnormal or impaired belief, 
experience, and social structure take priority over concepts of neural dysfunction. This 
heterogeneity continues to generate much uncertainty concerning the conceptual foundations for 
psychiatry. What exactly is psychiatry a science of? Mind or brain? Individual or society? Dysfunction 
or deviance? These questions are as much philosophical as empirical. 
 
Psychiatry evidently adopts many different levels of explanation, customarily divided into the 
categories of the biological, psychological, and social. The view of psychiatry as holistic dates back to 
Hippocrates, but today it is strongly associated with Engel’s (3) biopsychosocial paradigm (BPS). The 
BPS paradigm was as broad as it was ambitious: Engel sought an all-encompassing framework for 
clinical practice, along with a non-reductive metaphysics for mental disorder. Given its intended 
scope, it is not surprising that this proposal failed to engender a clearly identifiable research 
programme. Engel did not provide details as to how biological, psychological, and social factors 
should be combined in diagnosing, describing, explaining, and treating mental illness (5, 9). And yet 
the conception of psychiatry as a biopsychosocial discipline remains influential. As Gabbard and Kay 
(4: p.1956) observe, ‘almost all psychiatrists… endorse the notion that psychiatrists are distinct from 
all other mental health professionals in that their training and expertise allow them to be the 
ultimate integrators of the biological and psychosocial perspectives underlying diagnostic 
understanding and treatment.’ The BPS paradigm is, in a sense, everywhere and yet nowhere. 
 
There is significant need for a reassessment of the BPS paradigm. In what follows, we assume a 
minimal, vague, conception of ‘BPS’ as signifying any approach that a) spans multiple levels of 
explanation, and b) is opposed to bio-reductionism. Our aim is to distinguish a number of ways in 
which this minimal view could be refined, developed, and implemented, across different explanatory 
domains. Our concern, then, is not so much retrospective as prospective. How should we 
understand the legacy of Engel’s BPS paradigm for psychiatry present and future? In what differing 
ways can we conceptualise the links between biological, psychological, and social factors in 
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explaining mental disorder? Can these conceptualisations help capture the elusive influence of the 
BPS paradigm in psychiatry? Answering these questions requires philosophical as well as empirical 
nous (2). 
 
In preview, we distinguish four possible (re)conceptualisations of the BPS paradigm. The paradigm 
could be viewed as a guide to (i) which factors are relevant in identifying or classifying psychiatric 
disorders; (ii) the range of possible causes of such disorders; (iii) strategies for effective prevention 
and treatment; or (iv) the metaphysics of psychiatric disorder. Let us take a closer look at each of 
these conceptions in turn. 
 
Psychiatric Classification 
The BPS paradigm can be conceived as an approach to the classification of mental disorders. 
Practitioners require diagnostic categories that facilitate shared, reliable standards for identifying 
mental disorders. The BPS paradigm has clearly been influential in the production of such 
classificatory systems. For example, psychosocial factors were explicitly referenced in the axial 
system of DSM-IV under Axis IV. DSM-V no longer adopts this axial system, but still reflects the 
perceived importance of social, cultural, and environmental factors in accurate diagnosis and 
classification. In the last few years the DSM has been challenged by the RDoC, which seeks a new 
taxonomy of mental disorder based on neurobiological measures. At least for now, however, the 
BPS-style approach to psychiatric classification remains orthodoxy. 
 
It is important to distinguish two possible interpretations of this approach. On a conceptual 
interpretation, biopsychosocial factors determine the content or meaning of psychiatric categories. 
‘Major depression’, for example, might be analysed as meaning ‘the condition characterised by 
biological, psychological, and social factors X, Y, and Z’. On an epistemic interpretation, in contrast, 
biopsychosocial factors merely provide clinical signs or evidence for classifying a patient under a 
certain psychiatric category. This latter interpretation seems more appropriate in understanding the 
influence of the BPS paradigm on the DSM. Further philosophical development is needed, however, 
to clarify the commitments of the approach. 
 
Psychiatric Causation 
A second conception of the BPS paradigm relates to the study of psychiatric causation. The last few 
decades has seen an explosion of research on the relationship between environmental ‘stressors’ or 
‘insults’ and the development of mental illness. Epidemiological studies indicate that for most 
disorders, the risk of developing the condition is not determined by biological factors alone. There is 
complex interplay between causal factors at biological, psychological and social levels. To pick just 
one example, perceived parenting style is associated with risk of various psychopathologies in 
adulthood, including major depression and anxiety disorders. Gene-environment interactions and 
correlations present further intricacies, which are only just beginning to be understood. 
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In this context, the BPS paradigm can be developed via the claim that the causes of mental illness 
are spread over multiple explanatory levels. This sort of approach is discernible, for example, in 
Kendler’s (6) description of the dappled nature of psychiatric causation, a term he borrows from 
Cartwright. Once again, however, this merely marks the beginning of a view; more philosophical 
focus is needed. What is the operative notion of causation here? How should we make sense of 
claims such as that socioeconomic inequality can be a cause of schizophrenia? What causal 
mechanisms are involved? These remain some of the most challenging conceptual questions 
currently facing psychiatry. 
 
Prevention and Treatment of Psychiatric Disorder 
The foregoing BPS-style view of causation may influence the ways in which clinicians intervene to 
prevent or treat these psychiatric disorder. Leff and colleagues (7, 8), for example, investigated the 
links between relapse rates of schizophrenics and their social environment. They found that 
‘[r]elapse of schizophrenia is more likely if patients live with relatives who are excessively critical 
and/or over-involved. Such relatives are designated as high EE [“expressed emotion”]’ (7: p. 121). 
This causal insight led Leff and colleagues to devise a programme of social interventions that 
significantly reduced relapse rates by reducing relatives’ EE and/or reducing patients’ social contact 
with high EE relatives. But the proposed BPS conception of prevention and treatment is not merely 
an extension of a ‘dappled’ view of causation: the approach raises distinctive and challenging 
questions regarding social policy and the ethics of healthcare interventions. What types of 
psychological or social intervention are permissible in the prevention of mental disorder? How 
should we adjudicate between pharmacological and psychosocial treatments? These philosophical 
issues demand closer scrutiny. 
 
Metaphysics of Psychiatric Disorder 
Our final conception of the BPS paradigm relates to the metaphysics of mental disorder. By way of 
background, the philosophical mind-body problem concerns the nature of the relationship between 
mental states – notably qualitative states of phenomenal consciousness – and states of the brain. 
Psychiatrists sometimes write as if the only two views of this relation are reductionism and dualism, 
and as if a denial of reductionism is tantamount to embracing dualism. Yet the current orthodoxy in 
philosophy of mind is neither reductionist nor dualist, but rather non-reductive and monist. Glossing 
over many important details, this position maintains that descriptions and explanations expressed in 
the language of psychology are irreducible to descriptions and explanations expressed in the 
language of biology, while insisting that mental states are nonetheless entirely physical in nature.  
 
Viewed in this context, Engel’s metaphysical aspirations for the BPS paradigm seem prescient, if 
insufficiently articulated. The paradigm was presented as an alternative to the ‘reductionist 
biomedical model’ (3), and thus naturally lends itself to integration with the anti-reductionist 
philosophical theories of mind that have prospered since the 1960s and 1970s. Most philosophers of 
mind today would think it uncontroversial that accounts of mental disorder must engage 
psychological-level concepts. Some ‘vehicle externalists’ even view the mind as partly constituted by 
processes within our natural and social environments (1). Although much further discussion is 
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needed, it is natural to see these theories as embodying BPS-style views of the nature of mental 
disorder. 
 
Whilst highly theoretical, these metaphysical issues have major practical repercussions. For example, 
if some aspects of mental disorder are irreducibly psychosocial, then arguably our classificatory 
systems should reflect this. Insights from philosophy of mind therefore may inform the conflict 
between BPS-style systems and the RDoC, the latter clearly reflecting an ambitiously reductive view 
of mental disorder. More controversially, if vehicle externalism is true, then the psychiatric sciences 
will have to look outside the skin for a complete understanding of mental disorder. If my reasoning 
capacities are partly constituted by extrinsic processes, for example, then presumably these 
capacities may be impaired by changes in these processes. These suggestions are promissory and in 
need of significant development. They serve to illustrate, however, the continued relevance of the 
BPS paradigm to the foundations of psychiatry. 
 
Conclusion 
We have distinguished a number of (re)conceptualisations of the BPS paradigm, each relevant to 
different areas of psychiatry. The term ‘biopsychosocial’, which has seemed so familiar to many, 
permits a variety of interpretations that are of significance to contemporary psychiatry. Though 
much maligned, the prospects for the BPS paradigm, given more careful articulation, are not as bleak 
as some have claimed (5, 9). 
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